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43 
Identity after Identity Politics 
Linda Nicholson  
There is something very strange about the nation‘s current 
discourse on race and gender.
1
 On the one hand, race and gender are 
more than ever recognized as important phenomena of social life. In 
the 2008 presidential campaign, we constantly talked about both as 
influencing the outcome. We wondered whether Hillary Clinton‘s 
crying was helpful or not to her campaign for the Democratic Party‘s 
presidential nomination. We pondered how the racial remarks of 
Barack Obama‘s pastor might hurt Obama‘s chances. We talked 
about Clinton‘s appeal to older, white women and Obama‘s problems 
with older, white men. The topics of race and gender were all over 
the news, with few disputing the assumption that race and gender 
would in some ways affect the outcome. But, at the same time, even 
while we were making the above claims, we also kept saying that the 
era of identity politics was dead and that Americans were now in a 
―post‖ racial and ―post‖ gender era.2 And now that that presidential 
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 1. In this Article, mostly I will be using ―gender‖ to refer to the male/female distinction 
though occasionally I will use ―sex.‖ In current usage, ―gender‖ has become the more common 
term. However, there are many instances in even contemporary usage where ―sex‖ is still more 
frequently used. Since an important element of this Article involves describing how ―sex‖ 
became ―gender,‖ it seems more appropriate to use ―sex‖ when historically, or even in the 
present, that term is the one more commonly used. 
 2. David Roediger makes this point about the many proclamations of the ending of race 
in Race Will Survive the Obama Phenomena, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Oct. 10, 2008, at B6–8. 
The following statement also points to the fact that some believe we are now in a ―post-black‖ 
world: 
A decade ago they called post-blacks Oreos because we didn‘t think blackness equaled 
ghetto, didn‘t mind having white influencers, didn‘t seem full of anger about the past. 
We were comfortable enjoying blackness as a grace note rather than as our primary 
sound. Post-blackness sees blackness not as a dogmatic code worshipping at the altar 
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race is behind us, we still continue to assume that race and gender 
profoundly influence social life even as we continue to proclaim that 
race and gender no longer matter. What is going on? How can we be 
so loudly and constantly talking about race and gender even as we 
keep saying to ourselves that we are no longer thinking or talking 
about such things? 
In this Article I want to explore this pronounced contradiction in 
our current discourse about race and gender. I do so not only because 
there seems something very strange about a national discourse which 
endorses two very contradictory ideas. I do so because this 
contradiction is embedded in many of the policy dilemmas we face 
and provides cover for rhetorical manipulation in political 
disagreements. Educational policymakers worry about the fairness of 
single sex schools even in the face of evidence that indicates their 
educational benefits for some.
3
 Politicians claim to reject ―identity 
politics‖ even as they use versions of these politics to advance their 
political chances.
4
  
If we are to resolve such confusion and avoid such manipulation, 
we must talk more about the contradiction itself: about why 
historically we have inherited it and about how we ought to deal with 
it. In this Article, I will address these goals firstly by elaborating on 
some of the historical contexts that have shaped how we think today 
about race and gender. Drawing together themes from my recent 
book, Identity Before Identity Politics, I will show that our 
 
of the hood and the struggle but as an open-source document, a trope with infinite 
uses. 
Touré, Visible Young Man, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at BR1 (reviewing COLSON WHITEHEAD, 
SAG HARBOR (2009)).  
 3. Some of the controversy over single sex schools is addressed in JANICE M. IRVINE, 
TALK ABOUT SEX: THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); see 
also Kathryn Herr, Accountability and Single-Sex Schooling: A Collision of Reform Agendas, 
41 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 527 (2004). 
 4. Thus in July 2008 John McCain accused Barack Obama ―of playing the race card‖ 
because Obama had previously pointed to the fact that Obama didn‘t look like most other 
presidents on dollar bills. However, it could be argued that this accusation was made in the 
context of a campaign, where some others, if not McCain himself, at least implicity used 
Obama‘s race as a means to question Obama‘s patriotism and other character issues. On the 
McCain accusation, see Michael Cooper and Michael Powell, McCain Camp Says Obama is 
Playing ―Race Card,‖ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
08/01/us/politics/01campaign.html?em. 
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contemporary contradictory stance about the relevance and 
irrelevance of race and gender is at least partly the historical legacy 
of the growth over the course of the twentieth century of two very 
different ways of using environmentalism to think about race and 
gender.
5
 Both ways of thinking were employed to combat older forms 
of racism and sexism, yet each also contradicts the other in important 
ways. The first way of thinking, initially infiltrating public discourse 
in the first half of the twentieth century, and then becoming widely 
adopted during the second half of the twentieth century, used 
environmentalism to deny the importance and depth of racial and 
gender differences. This denial became attached to a politics that 
stressed the commonality of human beings and claimed that 
differences operated only at the individual level. The second way of 
thinking aimed to attack racism and sexism not by denying such 
differences, but by describing these differences as environmentally 
caused and by rejecting many of the older valuations of these 
differences. This second approach was initially adopted by advocates 
of identity politics in the late 1960s, specifically in the case of race by 
those who turned from civil rights to Black Power, and in the case of 
gender by those who moved from women‘s rights to women‘s 
liberation. These advocates began to see political limitations in the 
earlier civil rights and women‘s rights movements stress on human 
similarities and began to formulate a politics based more upon 
differences. While this stress on differences was initially promulgated 
by advocates of identity politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a 
greater acceptance of the reality and importance of socially caused 
differences has also become more an accepted part of public thinking 
in the decades since. Thus, both denying differences and accepting 
differences have now become part of public discourse. In short, we 
are now left with two very contradictory ways of thinking and talking 
about race and gender.  
That historical examination will then lead me to the second 
purpose of this Article: to provide means for getting us beyond this 
impasse. I will argue that while both of these ways of using 
environmentalism to combat older forms of racism and sexism 
 
 5. LINDA NICHOLSON, IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS (2008). 
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generated productive political consequences in their time, both also 
are problematic in various ways. Moreover, the problems in both 
stem from a premise shared by both: that race and gender depict 
relatively stable bodily and behavioral characteristics whose effects 
(either minimal or maximal) are stable across social contexts. I will 
argue that we need to reject this common premise and instead come 
to understand race and gender more fully as symbolic/linguistic 
means by which bodies, behaviors, and their relationships with each 
other and with diverse social situations are variously interpreted. This 
latter way of thinking about race and gender can help us to better 
understand some of the complex ways in which these categories of 
identity operate today. Most importantly, it can help us move beyond 
our present ―either/or‖ way of thinking about the current relevance of 
these two social categories.  
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
For most of the nineteenth century in the United States, as well as 
in many western countries, very few would have adhered to the idea 
that race and sex did not matter. Most ordinary folks, as well as 
intellectuals, assumed that there existed different types of racial and 
sexual human beings who varied from each other in profound and 
naturally given ways. Few doubted that nature generated important 
character and behavioral differences between men and women, and 
among members of different racial groups. Such differences in 
character and behavior were in turn often assumed to both explain 
and justify the different social places members of such groups 
occupied.
6
 ―Identity politics‖ did not emerge de novo in the 1960s; it 
was alive and well in western societies long before the twentieth 
century. 
But ideas about identity were curiously applied in the nineteenth 
century U.S. While theoretically both ―race‖ and ―sex‖ were neutral 
organizing categories of nature, that is, means for placing all human 
 
 6. Nature was used to justify hierarchical social arrangements among other groups as 
well, i.e., between the wealthy and the poor. However, since this Article is about identity 
politics, which principally were about the social categories of race and class, it is the history of 
these two categories that are the focus of this Article. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/4
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beings into one kind of racial and sexual box or another, in actuality, 
―nature‖ was differentially relevant to the different boxes that these 
categories established. In the case of race, while ―black‖ and ―white‖ 
were, on one level, equivalently ―natural‖ ways of distinguishing 
human beings, in actuality, those designated as ―black‖ were 
understood by many white people to be much more a product of their 
naturally given ―race‖ than did many whites understand themselves. 
―White‖ was a curious self identity designator, one that made itself 
less relevant for explaining an individual‘s specific characteristics 
than other identity designators, such as ―citizen‖ or ―worker.‖ 
―Black,‖ on the contrary, at least from the perspective of whites, 
operated in the opposite way, making itself more relevant for 
explaining an individual‘s character and behavior than such other 
categories. But since race was an identifier of nature whereas other 
identity designators such as ―citizen‖ and ―worker‖ were thought 
more as following from an individual‘s exercise of reason and will, 
whites often understood blacks as having their characters and 
behaviors more thoroughly determined by nature than was the case 
with their own. In short, whites tended to think of themselves more as 
capable of rising above nature and shaping their destiny through the 
exercise of reason and will. Whites, on the contrary, tended to think 
of blacks as more homogeneously determined by inborn 
characteristics over which blacks possessed little control. 
This differential naturalization of blacks and whites was made 
possible by a host of prior historical factors. Even before the 
expansion of slavery in the new world in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Europeans had often thought about those of 
African descent as lesser than themselves. But explanations as to why 
this was the case had relied primarily upon non-naturalistic stories, 
stories which appealed to the Bible or to negative accounts about the 
distinct daily practices and forms of government of African peoples.
7
 
 
 7. Philip Nicholson underlines this power of Biblical understandings to justify inferiority 
by pointing to a 1656 court ruling. In this year, an African American woman was granted 
freedom from slavery by a Virginia court on the grounds that she was a Christian. As he notes, 
religious affiliation became irrelevant to later courts in determining the justification of slavery. 
See PHILIP NICHOLSON, WHO DO WE THINK WE ARE: RACE AND NATION IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 76 (M.E. Sharpe 1999). Nicholas Hudson points to the disparaging accounts of the 
practices and governments of many, though not all, African peoples in many seventeenth 
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It was only beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth century, as 
natural science gained authority as a source of explanation for many 
different kinds of phenomena, that these stories began to appeal 
increasingly to nature as the cause of human differences.
8
 But as to 
why nature was used differentially in regard to blacks and whites, 
requires attention to the expansion of colonialism and slavery and to 
changing meanings about white social identity in many parts of the 
country in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One of the 
consequences of imperial conquest and of slavery was to erase the 
local and specific identities of those who were conquered.
9
 In the 
United States, a common colonial administration did much to erase 
the specific, local identities of Native Americans.
10
 African slaves 
also lost their local identities in the transatlantic crossing. While 
some slave owners knew of the specific geographical backgrounds of 
some of their slaves, this was not an identity signifier of great 
importance to these owners.
11
 On the contrary, other differences, 
particularly those differences of natural appearance that were 
becoming increasingly encompassed under the newly emerging 
category of race, were becoming of much greater significance. A very 
different story of self-identification was, however, occurring with 
whites. During this period, many white male property owners were 
seeing themselves not only as linked genealogically to a particular 
and supposedly highly ―civilized‖ nation, but by the late eighteenth 
century, now even as ―citizens‖ capable of creating and sustaining a 
government through the exercise of reason and will alone. Moreover, 
 
century travelers‘ reports. Nicholas Hudson, From ―Nation‖ to ―Race‖: The Origins of Racial 
Classification in Eighteenth Century Thought, 29 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 247, 249–50 
(1996). 
 8. Two among many works that describe this change are NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA OF 
RACE IN SCIENCE: GREAT BRITAIN 1800–1960 (1982); RACISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
(Harold E. Pagliaro ed., 1973). 
 9. This is a point stressed by Hudson, supra note 7. Hudson argues that this loss of local 
identity made it possible for Europeans to then identify those conquered under the very broad 
and encompassing categories of race. This way of characterizing those conquered contrasted 
with the ways in which eighteenth century Europeans were now coming to characterize 
themselves, as members of distinct ―nations.‖ ―Nations,‖ unlike ―races‖ differed among 
themselves not by reference to natural characteristics but by reference to differences of custom. 
Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 251–52. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/4
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during the nineteenth century, the work identities of white men 
particularly in the northeast and expanding west were becoming 
increasingly disassociated from family descent and were coming to 
be seen more as the outcome of individual character and will.
12
 In 
short, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as those of 
African descent were coming to be identified in increasingly 
naturalistic terms, many of those of English descent were coming to 
understand themselves in ways that marked themselves as rising 
above nature. By the late nineteenth century, when evolutionary 
accounts began to gain increasing popularity, it was not surprising 
that a revival of an older ―great chain of being‖ metaphor was used to 
place blacks between animals and humans and to place whites as 
furthest away from all natural phenomena.
13
 
Very similar dynamics were occurring in regard to the use of the 
category of sex in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here also, 
changes in male and female social roles meant that the new authority 
of nature came to be applied in differential ways to men and 
women.
14
 As noted, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
male labor in many parts of the country was becoming less linked to 
the family and to inherited occupations, enabling male identity to 
become viewed as more the result of individual character and ability 
than of genealogical lineage. With women, on the other hand, some 
natural aspects of their social role were growing during this period as 
―mothering‖ was expanding its meaning. ―Mothering‖ was coming to 
 
 12. I discuss this change in the meaning of ―manhood‖ in the nineteenth century United 
States in IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 5, at 29–33. Several books that I 
relied upon in my discussion were: E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA (1993); 
MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2006); DAVID G. PUGH, 
SONS OF LIBERTY: THE MASCULINE MIND IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1983).  
 13. Nancy Stepan discusses this revival for racial purposes of an older ―great chain of 
being‖ metaphor in THE IDEA OF RACE IN SCIENCE, supra note 8, at 6. On how scientists, 
employing this metaphor, then began to ―prove‖ the higher standing of those of European 
descent to those of African descent, see STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1996). 
 14. On how science came to describe women in particularly naturalistic terms, see 
ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF MODERN 
FEMINISM (1982); CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN 
CONSTRUCTION OF WOMANHOOD (1989); Charles E. Rosenberg, The Female Animal: Medical 
and Biological Views of Women, in NO OTHER GODS: ON SCIENCE AND AMERICAN SOCIAL 
THOUGHT 54 (rev. ed., 1961, 1962 and 1976). 
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include not only the activity of bearing children and taking care of 
infants but also of rearing older children. ―Mothering,‖ with all of its 
natural associations, therefore was coming to be seen as a more 
encompassing aspect of women‘s identity than it had been. To be 
sure, class and race were complicating factors regarding how 
―natural‖ women were understood to be. But even upper and middle 
class white women, who in many respects were viewed as far 
removed from the influence of natural desires, were understood as 
much more governed by their reproductive organs than were their 
male counterparts.
15
 With ―sex‖ as well as with ―race,‖ naturalistic 
explanations could be employed in very differential kinds of ways. 
To be sure, not all in the population ascribed to such beliefs. Some 
intellectuals challenged the importance of race and sex in shaping the 
characters of blacks and women. These intellectuals emphasized the 
commonality of human nature, arguing that the differences among us 
were less significant than the similarities. They also claimed that the 
differences that did exist were more the result of environmental 
influences than they were of what was naturally given.
16
 But it was 
not until the middle of the twentieth century that assumptions about 
natural group differences began to be challenged extensively within 
more popular discourse. Within the early twentieth century academy, 
 
 15. On the ways in which mothering changed its meaning in this period and came to 
ground a particularly naturalistic view of women see my discussion in IDENTITY BEFORE 
IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 5, at 26–29; see also Ruth Bloch, American Feminine Ideals in 
Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785–1815, 4 FEMINIST STUDIES 101 (1978); Jan 
Lewis, Mother’s Love: The Construction of an Emotion in Nineteenth Century America, in 
SOCIAL HISTORY AND ISSUES IN HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 209 (Andrew E. Barnes & Peter N. 
Stearns eds., 1989).  
 16. Such eighteenth and nineteenth century intellectuals as Mary Wollstonecraft, John 
Stuart Mill, and Harriet Taylor are well known for these positions and tied their arguments for 
political change to their environmental positions. But these ideas can even be found among 
many intellectuals not noted for such political positions. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, for 
example, a noted creator of the idea of ―race,‖ used ―race‖ to distinguish the human population 
on the grounds of physical appearance. But Blumenbach, in the company of many other 
eighteenth century monogenists, also pointed to the transient and environmentally caused nature 
of such differences. Nancy Stepan notes this position of Blumenbach in STEPAN, supra note 8, 
at 9. Environmentalism was a significant idea, though related in complex ways to diverse 
political positions, among many intellectuals in Europe and the United States throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was expressed by many, in the U.S., such as Benjamin 
Franklin, who did not in other respects support human equality. On the reference to Franklin, 
see GOULD, supra note 13, at 71.  
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whole disciplines, such as psychology and anthropology, switched 
their previous allegiances from somatic based frameworks of 
explanation to environmentally based ones. New intellectual 
approaches such as dynamic psychology and cultural anthropology 
were reflected in the writings of scholars like Sigmund Freud and 
Ruth Benedict, scholars whose ideas spread beyond the academy and 
into U.S. popular discourse.
17
  
By the middle part of the twentieth century in the United States, 
environmentally based explanations of social group differences had 
come to have a significant degree of social credibility. Qualifying this 
point is that at this moment in time, such acceptance was more 
widespread in regard to some group differences than others. White 
Protestants of English and northern European descent had become 
more willing to think of such previously racialized groups as Jewish 
Americans, Irish Americans and Italian Americans as different from 
themselves in trivial and environmentally caused ways, i.e., as 
members of ―ethnic groups,‖ than they were to think of African 
Americans in such terms.
18
 And male/female differences were still 
largely understood as differences of nature. But even with regard to 
the differences between women and men and between European and 
African Americans, some greater acceptance of environmentalism 
was evident by the middle of the century.  
One sign of this change in thinking about both of these groups 
was the increased support activists could generate for challenges to 
the social exclusion of women and blacks from previously racially 
and sexually designated public spaces. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, activist organizations such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National 
Women‘s Party had worked for the rights of African Americans and 
women to occupy such spaces equally with whites and with men. But 
it was not until the 1950s and 1960s that organizations committed to 
these ideals could generate the kinds of mass movements that were 
 
 17. I discuss the changes in these disciplines and their effects on public opinion in 
IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 5, at 35–91.  
 18. On the differences in the ways in which white Americans came to view African 
Americans from other immigrants of non-northern European descent in the first half of the 
twentieth century, see MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSEN, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: 
EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 201–73 (1998). 
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able to make major challenges to the legalization of such forms of 
exclusion. This new ability to generate mass movements had many 
causes, including changes within the growth of such organizations 
themselves.
19
 However, also contributing to their increased success 
was a growing acceptance within the general population about the 
legitimacy of their goals. And here, the growth in credibility of 
environmentalist explanations played an important role. 
Activists in the civil rights and women‘s rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, as well as those who pushed for similar goals in 
earlier decades, relied heavily upon such environmental explanations 
in generating support. But they used these explanations in particular 
kinds of ways to make particular kinds of political arguments. Firstly, 
they used environmentalism to minimize the depth and importance of 
differences among human beings.
20
 Nature, as author of human 
differences, was a serious force to counter. If differences among us 
were naturally caused, those differences must be deep and wide. 
Environmental influences, on the other hand, could be described as 
more arbitrary and shallow, affecting us all in more accidental and 
limited ways. An attack on the natural causes of human differences 
through appeal to environmental factors could therefore also be used 
as an attack on the depth and pervasiveness of such differences. 
Those who emphasized the environmental causes of human 
differences in the first half of the twentieth century tended to 
 
 19. For an exposition of some of the historical events that led to the flourishing of the 
Civil Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY 
COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY, 1890–2000, 203–93 (2001). Other useful works include 
those of ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA‘S CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (1991) and HOWARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1954–1992 
(rev. ed. 1993). I discuss some of the historical changes that led to the emergence of the 
women‘s rights movement in the early 1960s in IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, supra 
note 5, at 161–67. 
 20. For an excellent discussion about how, from early on in the twentieth century, those 
promoting civil rights for African Americans avoided arguments that stressed differences 
between African Americans and European Americans, and relied instead on those that stressed 
similarities between the two groups, see LEE D. BAKER, FROM SAVAGE TO NEGRO: 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACE, 1896–1954 (1998). A good discussion of 
this tendency can also be found in Matthew FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT 
COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 91–135 (1998). As Jacobson 
notes in this chapter, those who wished to de-emphasize the importance of race, most often still 
accepted the reality of race. The consequence is that while they were pushing to de-emphasize 
the idea of race in certain contexts, they were also emphasizing it in others. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Identity after Identity Politics 53 
 
 
minimize differences associated with race and sex—to speak, for 
example, of race as ―about skin color only.‖ They acknowledged 
existing differences in patterns of behavior among those of different 
races and now ―genders,‖ but also claimed that such differences 
could—and following principles of fairness perhaps should—be 
changed to overcome whatever limitations were associated with such 
differences. 
Secondly, appeals to environmentalism were politically used by 
early- and mid-century activists to strengthen claims about the 
individuality of each of us. ―Nature‖ as organizer of human 
differences had often been presented as simple and orderly. Those 
who argued that nature differentiated humans also argued that it did 
so in organized ways, placing us all into one or another clearly 
differentiated box. Activists opposing this position pointed to 
environmental influences as more arbitrary and accidental, and 
consequently as capable of generating human beings who could not 
easily be placed into boxes at all. Thus, those who stressed 
environmentalism in the first half of the twentieth century tended also 
to stress the individuality of human character, an emphasis that 
cohered well with that emphasis on individuality that had long been 
an important thread in U.S. white male self-understanding. Now 
women and blacks could claim to be as ―individual‖ as white men. 
In sum, by the middle of the twentieth century, a certain 
understanding of environmentalism had become tied to a certain type 
of politics. This politics was one that sought to expand the 
opportunities open to women and blacks by elaborating on the 
minimal relevance of race and sex as social organizing categories. 
African American activists and their supporters stressed the point that 
―race‖ was ―about skin color only,‖ thereby emphasizing human 
similarities over differences. Both civil rights advocates and those 
beginning to argue for ―women‘s rights‖ made claims about the 
individuality of us all. These kinds of claims, in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century, seemed most able to convince large parts of 
the U.S. population to overturn legalized forms of racial and what 
now was increasingly coming to be called ―gender‖ discrimination.  
Such arguments have been highly successful. During the second 
half of the twentieth century, after the onset of the civil rights 
movement and the women‘s rights movement, an ever-growing 
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portion of the American public has come to reject the idea that 
people‘s characters are the result of group-based, naturally given 
differences. ―Nature‖ is still given much credence in affecting who 
we are. But increasingly since the middle of the twentieth century, 
nature has come to be seen as operating at an individual level, 
individually determining our genetic makeup and only therefore at an 
individual level, our characters.
21
  
But while appeals to the individuality and similarity of human 
beings had been gaining increased credibility among the general U.S. 
population and contributing to the success of the civil rights and 
women‘s rights movement by the middle of the twentieth century, 
and continuing after, a very different set of ideas was also coming to 
gain credibility among certain sections of the population slightly later 
in the century. To understand this second set of ideas requires going 
back to the 1920s and 1930s and the emergence of a different way of 
thinking about the implications of environmentalism for 
understanding social group differences. This way of thinking did not 
use environmentalism to minimize social group differences or to 
emphasize human individuality but instead employed it to describe 
and explain group differences. This alternative use of 
environmentalism became elaborated through a new meaning of 
―culture.‖  
Prior to the twentieth century, ―Culture‖ had referred primarily to 
the special accomplishments of the few. It included those very special 
artistic, intellectual, and personal practices that could be found 
among those who saw themselves as having risen above natural 
determination. But as environmentalism became a more credible way 
of understanding human character, so too did new understandings 
begin to arise about the differences that separated the practices of 
groups of human beings. Anthropologists, among others, began to 
 
 21. Obviously, I am speaking only of a trend as there remain many in the U.S. population 
who believe that ―race‖ and ―sex‖ determine the characters and behaviors of different groups of 
people in overarching and homogeneous kinds of ways. I often think of history as like a 
kaleidoscope where at any given moment in time within a given society there will be present a 
variety of diverse beliefs about the same issue. At following turns of the kaleidoscope, or 
moments in time, all of the previous beliefs may still be present, but now in slightly different 
degrees of intensity, with some having grown darker and others lighter. I hope readers will 
understand my historical claims in light of this metaphor. 
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introduce into popular discourse a new, much less elitist meaning of 
―culture,‖ one which referred not to the special accomplishments of 
the few, but to the entire ―way of life‖ of distinct social groups. Such 
differences in ―ways of life‖ were not the consequence of some 
groups having been able to rise above nature but were rather merely 
the consequence of all groups being subject to different 
environmental heritages and challenges. ―Culture‖ with a small ―c‖ 
was now found in the ordinary practices of all social groups.
22
 
This new concept of ―culture‖ was the consequence of applying 
environmentalist ways of thinking to whole societies. It suggested 
that whole societies, or social groups within them, differed in their 
practices only because each had encountered unique environmental 
influences and challenges. While this invocation of environmentalism 
theoretically was only about the acquisition of group characteristics, 
it also had political implications. If differences among social groups 
were the understandable responses of differentially situated groups to 
different types of environmental influences and challenges, then it 
became harder to label such differences as necessarily inferior or 
superior to one another. Not surprisingly, the adoption of societal 
environmentalism, first within the academic discipline of 
anthropology, and then later within the general public, has been 
accompanied by a certain move toward cultural relativism, i.e., the 
position that diverse societies are not so much ―better‖ or ―worse‖ 
than one another, as they are just ―different‖ from one another.23 
The gradual introduction of this new idea of ―culture‖ and of 
―cultural relativism‖ is illustrated in changes in many aspects of U.S. 
popular media from the 1930s onward. New types of publishing 
houses, new types of magazines, and new forms of music and theater, 
began to introduce a wide public to scholars, such as Margaret Mead, 
 
 22. I elaborate this history of the idea of ―culture‖ in chapter 3 of IDENTITY BEFORE 
IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 5, at 65–91. Sources that were useful in my exposition include: 
GEORGE STOCKING, JR., RACE, CULTURE, AND EVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY (1968); WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1984); SUSAN HEGEMAN, PATTERNS 
FOR AMERICA: MODERNISM AND THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE (1999); and RAYMOND WILLIAMS, 
KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1976).  
 23. This is an argument I elaborate in chapter 3 of IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, 
supra note 5, at 65–91. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:43 
 
 
who wrote sympathetically about the diverse ―ways of life‖ of 
unfamiliar societies. They also introduced to such a public certain 
fictional authors—such as Pearl S. Buck—who described previously 
disparaged social groups in sympathetic ways. New forms of popular 
entertainment were created—such as the documentary and weekly 
pictorial magazines such as Life—that also portrayed ordinary people 
from different ―ways of life‖ in positive terms. Members of 
previously disparaged groups, such as Jewish Americans, African 
Americans, and Italian Americans, increasingly became participants 
in these new media during the middle part of the twentieth century. 
They introduced to the wider population new forms of music, new 
types of literature, and new types of food. In doing so, social group 
differences became understood more as what added to American 
social life rather than as what detracted from it.
24
 
But though there was growing acceptance about ―difference‖ 
among social group practices in the middle of the century, neither 
civil rights nor women‘s rights groups initially relied upon such 
acceptance in their political activism. There were a variety of reasons 
for this reluctance. Most importantly, while white Americans could 
begin to think about the life practices of those living in foreign 
countries or in parts of the U.S. other than their own as interesting or 
―quaint,‖ and culturally caused, they had much greater difficulty in 
adopting a similar attitude toward the distinctive life practices of 
African Americans or women. In the case of African Americans, too 
long a history of racism had marked such practices as signs of natural 
inferiority. While many were coming to adopt an environmentalist 
position regarding differences between African Americans and 
European Americans, ―race‖ was still also widely believed by many 
others to be not only a real way nature divided blacks and whites but 
also as what caused the former to be supposedly ―naturally‖ inferior 
 
 24. On changes in the nature of publishing houses in particular and on how that affected 
the types of literature available to a mass public, see GEORGE HUTCHINSON, THE HARLEM 
RENNAISSANCE IN BLACK AND WHITE 342–50 (1995). Changes in other media and the social 
consequences of these changes are described in very useful ways by Hegeman, Susman as well 
as by MICHAEL DENNING, THE CULTURAL FRONT: THE LABORING OF AMERICAN CULTURE IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996); CARL DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE (1991). I 
discuss these social implications in IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 5, at 82–
91. 
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to the latter. Consequently, any emphasis upon such differences in the 
case of African Americans could too easily raise the spectre of 
biological determinism with all of its implications of natural 
inferiority. Less derisive, though still biologically based, ideas about 
male/female differences were also still widely prevalent. In this case 
also, activists found it politically more expedient to minimize such 
differences rather than to call attention to their existence. 
From the political perspective then of civil rights and women‘s 
rights activists, a de-emphasis of group differences and an emphasis 
upon human similarity and human individuality made a lot of sense 
in the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, this type of stance fit in well 
with the political goals of the civil rights and women‘s rights 
movements of the period. If one‘s aims were to eliminate legalized 
forms of group discrimination, it made sense to de-emphasize any 
differences that might have provided justification for such 
discrimination. That many Americans were increasingly sympathetic 
to such arguments about the similarities and individualities of all only 
added to the sense of political leaders about the political wisdom of 
also arguing for such positions. 
However, as the goal of ending legalized discrimination became 
less pressing after the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights and 
Voting Rights Acts, and different kinds of political aims began to 
surface, so too did a growing number of younger activists begin to 
see limitations in the previous emphasis upon human similarity and 
individuality. To emphasize similarities or to claim ―that we are all 
just individuals‖ certainly worked against legalized discrimination 
based upon the explicit issues of race or gender. But, as these 
younger activists understood American society, the ending of 
legalized discrimination eliminated only part of the obstacles women 
and African Americans faced. 
For those who came to support Black Power, the ending of 
legalized discrimination did not adequately address the poverty that 
was pervasive in African American communities. Nor did it address 
the associations of blackness with inferiority that remained present in 
the psyches of both blacks and whites. For supporters of Black 
Power, mobilization around an emphasis upon what African 
Americans across classes shared—and on what differentiated them 
from European Americans—seemed the more effective means to 
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address both sets of issues. Many believed that an emphasis upon 
what African Americans shared could begin to establish the kind of 
power base necessary to attack such poverty. Moreover, this kind of 
emphasis could also begin to challenge the negative associations of 
the distinctive aspects of African American life. Through the 
proclamation of slogans such as ―Black Is Beautiful,‖ through 
demands for community control of schools and of more public and 
private hiring of blacks, through the creation of the Black Arts 
Movement, through the rejection of beauty products and styles that 
aimed to make blacks look more like whites, as well as through a host 
of other means, advocates of Black Power sought to eliminate 
pervasive black poverty and undue the historical associations of 
inferiority with black speech, black appearance, black dialectic, black 
food, black aesthetics, and other distinctive aspects of black life.
25
 
The women‘s liberation movement was very different in many 
respects from the Black Power movement. But, particularly within 
the large and influential section of that movement, radical feminism, 
in part inspired by Black Power, there also emerged in the early 
1970s an overlapping stress on differences, in this case between 
women and men. As with civil rights, so had ―women‘s rights‖ 
achieved a certain degree of legitimacy by the mid-nineteen sixties. 
But, as with civil rights, what was legitimate here were mostly claims 
 
 25. The Black Power movement was a complex movement, bringing together a wide 
range of positions and ideologies only superficially represented in this brief summary. Among 
the many books and essays that have expressed and described some of the goals and positions 
of Black Power, a few that I have found to be particularly useful include: KWAME TURE 
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS STOKELY CARMICHAEL) and CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE 
POLITICS OF LIBERATION (1992); Martin Kilson, Black Politics: A New Power, DISSENT, Aug. 
1971, at 333; Robert C. Smith, Black Power and the Transformation from Protest to Politics, 
96 POL. SCI. Q. 431 (1981). For other works that provide helpful discussion of some of the 
diverse positions represented in the Black Power movement, see WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, 
NEW DAY IN BABYLON: THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965–
1979 112–91 (1992); JOHN T. MCCARTNEY, BLACK POWER IDEOLOGIES: AN ESSAY IN 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992); ALPHONSO PINKNEY, RED, BLACK, AND 
GREEN: BLACK NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1976). Many other commentators, 
including MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION 99 (2d ed. 1991); THEODORE 
DRAPER, THE REDISCOVERY OF BLACK NATIONALISM 125 (1970); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, 
BETTER DAY COMING 313 (2008), also all point to the wide ranging meanings of black power. I 
provide a more lengthy discussion of this complex movement, including some claims about the 
reasons for its emergence in Chapter 4, ―Before Black Power: Constructing An African 
American Identity,‖ of IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 5, at 94–138.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Identity after Identity Politics 59 
 
 
about the rights of women to function equally with men in public life. 
Radical feminists, like advocates for Black Power, believed, 
however, that the discussion of social justice had to be extended 
beyond the topic of legalized public discrimination. Similar to Black 
Power advocates, radical feminists believed that such topics included 
those of culture and knowledge. But, differing from Black Power 
advocates, radical feminists believed that such topics also included 
areas of private life. In all, radical feminists brought the discussion 
about the operation of sexism into arenas that had been only 
minimally or tangentially considered by the women‘s rights 
movement: the bedroom, the kitchen, the academy, the arts, and the 
national psyche. Radical feminists generated the famous slogan ―The 
Personal is Political.‖ This slogan recast whole areas of social life, 
such as the organization of domestic labor and standard practices of 
heterosexual activity, from trivial and private issues to important and 
political ones. And beginning particularly in the early 1970s, radical 
feminists began to turn away from androgyny as a political ideal, 
moving instead to a reevaluation of women‘s distinctive 
characteristics.
26
  
In the case of both Black Power and radical feminism, advocates 
believed that as a consequence of the depth, complexity, and subtlety 
of the kinds of changes that needed to be made to truly eliminate 
racism and sexism, it was primarily black people and women 
respectively who were in the best position to formulate the goals of 
their movements. This stress on identity as a source for identifying 
political goals became important in the emergence of the label 
―identity politics.‖ The following statement by the Combahee River 
Collective illustrates this point and provides one of the earliest 
definitions of identity politics: ―This focusing upon our own 
oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe 
 
 26. The literature on radical feminism is too broad to try to summarize here. A few books 
that provide useful histories include, ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM 
IN AMERICA 1967–1975 (1989); SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN‘S 
LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979); RUTH ROSEN, THE 
WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN‘S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA (2000). I 
provide my own analysis of some of the causes of the emergence of this movement in Chapter 
5, ―Women‘s Identity/Women‘s Politics,‖ of IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS, supra note 
5, at 167–75. 
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that the most profound and potentially the most radical politics comes 
directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end 
somebody else‘s oppression.‖27 
In sum, the proponents of identity politics focused on the specific 
experiences and needs of blacks and women. They did so because 
they believed that the obstacles facing women and African 
Americans went beyond those of legalized discrimination and that 
countering those obstacles required paying attention to rather than 
denying such distinct experiences and needs. If the sexism and racism 
that still existed—in the bedroom, the academy, the business world, 
the national media, the entertainment industry, and in many aspects 
of public consciousness generally—were to be eradicated, the nation 
needed to pay attention to the complex and less than obvious ways in 
which blacks and whites, and women and men were still understood 
and treated differently and also to reassess the values associated with 
those understandings. 
As many of the arguments put forth by those pressing for the civil 
rights of blacks and women gained increased support among 
Americans by the middle of the century and continuing afterward, so 
also since the 1960s have many of the ideas initially put forth by the 
proponents of identity politics also attained increasing acceptance. 
Today many take for granted claims that environmentally caused 
social group differences about race and gender exist and that at least 
some of these differences contribute to rather than detract from public 
life. In the case of race, it is at least partly as a consequence of Black 
Power that white Americans more readily talk about the cultural 
differences associated with African American life in the kinds of 
ways that they had earlier talked about the cultural differences 
associated with European immigrant groups. Americans have grown 
more comfortable with the concept of ―diversity‖ and in 
contemporary public discourse use it to include African Americans as 
well as Jewish Americans, Italian Americans, etc. Moreover, there is, 
since the first emergence of Black Power, a much greater ability and 
willingness on the part of white Americans to recognize and talk 
about the existence of racism operating outside of the legal system: in 
 
 27. The Combahee River Collective: A Black Feminist Statement, in THE SECOND WAVE: 
A READER IN FEMINIST THEORY 63, 65 (Linda Nicholson ed., 1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Identity after Identity Politics 61 
 
 
cultural and psychological understandings of black and white, in the 
economy, in educational institutions, and in politics. In the past 
presidential election, there was much public discussion over the 
degree to which racism would manifest itself in the privacy of the 
voting booth while keeping itself hidden from public polling. 
Discussions about the continued presence of racial stereotyping in 
popular media and about the phenomena of differential expectations 
based on race in the public school system are all much more 
legitimate today than they were forty years ago. 
The situation is different in some respects, though similar in 
others, regarding the public‘s way of thinking about gender 
differences. Unlike ―race,‖ since the nineteenth century, differences 
between women and men have been less intensely associated with 
ideas of superiority/inferiority and more with ideas of simple 
difference. Consequently, talk about ―sex‖ differences historically 
has not been as politically charged as has talk about race differences. 
And since such differences can now, following the emergence of 
identity politics, more easily be understood as environmentally 
caused, i.e., as differences of ―gender‖ rather than of ―sex,‖ talk of 
gender differences does not invoke the necessary implications about 
immutability that such talk did in the past. All of this has made 
possible a virtual flood of public discourse about gender differences 
in the past few decades. While the best-selling book Men Are From 
Mars, Women Are From Venus
28
 is only a most obvious example of 
this ease in discussing gender difference, other examples are not hard 
to find. Both popular women‘s magazines and more cross-gender 
newspapers such as The New York Times frequently explore 
differences between women and men in terms of sexual desire, child 
rearing practices, and other behavioral phenomena.
29
 
 
 28. JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: THE CLASSIC GUIDE 
TO UNDERSTANDING THE OPPOSITE SEX (1992). 
 29. For example, The Sunday magazine section of The New York Times of January 25, 
2008, had a full length story on women‘s sexual desire and on the ways it might differ from 
men‘s. The following week, the magazine section had another story on the proliferation of 
households where educated single women were raising female children alone. In this second 
article, questions were raised about whether the female children were missing out on some 
types of parenting that the article, quoting KYLE PRUETT, FATHERNEED (2001), alleged were 
more typically male. Emily Bazelon, 2 Kids + 0 Husbands = Family, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
Feb. 1, 2008, at MM30, MM35.  
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Also, similarly with race, there exists much more public ease 
today than forty years ago in identifying behavior in many realms of 
life as ―sexist.‖ Radical feminism has been successful in gaining 
widespread public acceptance of the dictum that ―the personal is 
political.‖ Concepts that were unheard of prior to the emergence of 
radical feminism, concepts such as ―marital rape‖ and ―date rape,‖ 
have now become accepted terms in national discourse. The influence 
of radical feminism in changing the nature of national discourse was 
illustrated in the past presidential election. One interesting 
phenomenon of this past election was how easily and often 
conservative Republicans—men as well as women—appealed to the 
term ―sexism‖ when the media engaged in negative talk about Sarah 
Palin. Whereas just ten years ago charges invoking sexism would 
have been highly liable to counter charges of ―political correctness,‖ 
that latter counter charge today is much more out of date.  
On the other hand, there also continues to exist a great deal of fear 
and hesitancy in publicly appealing to race or gender as a means to 
explain any individual or social phenomenon. The long history of the 
use of such categories to demean and their continued association with 
ideas of biological determinism means that many still shy from their 
use. Moreover, operating in conjunction with the proud assertion of 
social group differences in American life, is also the continued power 
of American beliefs in individuality. Americans have a long history 
of regarding themselves as unfettered by social group designations 
and appeals to such designations are regarded as threatening to such 
self regard. Existing deep within the American psyche is the wish that 
past forms of designation have disappeared from present political and 
social spaces. Thus exists the strong appeal of the claim that we are 
presently in a ―post racial‖ period and the tendency to invoke 
Obama‘s presidency as evidence for the truth of that claim. Similarly, 
in the case of gender, while assumptions about gender difference 
abound in public discourse, and while there is widespread acceptance 
of the continued presence of sexism in social life, the public remains 
very dubious about supporting programs that might respond to such 
differences and remains wary of talk that explicitly focuses on such 
sexism. With gender, as with race, we seem to be committed to 
policy and discourse that is based on some very contradictory ways 
of thinking about these categories of identity. 
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II. RETHINKING SOCIAL CATEGORIES OF IDENTITY 
How do we reconcile these contradictions? How do we create a 
public discourse and establish reasonable public policy about race 
and gender that responds to what is valid in both of these positions, 
i.e., that both acknowledges what we believe to be true about the 
relevance of these categories and also responds to what is valid in 
claims about their irrelevance? I‘d like to begin tackling this question 
by focusing on the strengths and weaknesses in each of the two 
political positions that have supported each of these two stances, i.e., 
the position of the early rights-based movements that stressed 
similarity and individuality and the position of the identity political 
movements that stressed differences. In seeing what is valid and 
invalid in both positions, we can gain some clues about a different 
kind of model that goes beyond each and might help us out of our 
current impasse about the relevance or irrelevance of these categories 
today.  
As earlier noted, radical feminism and Black Power contributed to 
our national discourse about gender and race in part through their 
focus on the operation of gender and race in areas of social life that 
were not as obvious as public discrimination. Both caused us to look 
more closely at the role of these social categories in unconscious 
attitudes about merit, about beauty, about common practices of daily 
life, about norms of culture, and about how these attitudes sustained 
institutional differences in opportunities. While today the operation 
of these categories in these areas is certainly not the same as was the 
case forty years ago, in many of these less than obvious forms, these 
categories continue to matter. In many cities, de facto racial 
segregation is as high as it was in the 1960s.
30
 Murders where the 
victim is white continue to receive more media attention than do the 
murders of victims of different racial backgrounds.
31
 African 
American and European American children still largely segregate 
themselves socially even when attending integrated schools and this 
 
 30. VALERIE MARTINEZ-EBERS & MANOCHEHR DORRAJ, PERSPECTIVES ON RACE, 
ETHNICITY AND RELIGION 2 (2010). 
 31. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Murder and the Media, N.Y. TIMES, Tues., May 12, 2009, at 
A23. 
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segregation is sometimes associated with educational aspirations.
32
 
And even though there exists a larger African American middle class 
today than there did forty years ago, America‘s poor remain 
disproportionately non-white.
33
 Similar claims can be made about the 
continued relevance of gender in affecting American social life. A 
double standard regarding sexual activity can still be found among 
undergraduates in American universities.
34
 Despite radical 
feminism‘s diatribes against the objectification of women, women 
today still constrain themselves in a multitude of ways to conform to 
highly rigid norms of beauty.
35
 Anorexia, for example, while not 
exclusively found among young women, remains overwhelmingly a 
young women‘s disease.36 And even though women are a much larger 
part of the paid labor force at all levels of employment than they were 
forty years ago, women still do the great majority of childcare and 
 
 32. Julie Bettie, focusing on differences between girls of Mexican American and 
European American backgrounds in a central California school, shows how race often 
substitutes for class differences in the minds of students when students of mixed race and class 
backgrounds find themselves academically stratified in ways that highly correlate with class. 
Upwardly mobile Hispanic American students consequently have to work against accusations 
that they are ―acting white.‖ JULIE BETTIE, WOMEN WITHOUT CLASS: GIRLS, RACE, AND 
IDENTITY (2003) (see particularly, chapter 3, ―How Working-Class Chicas Get Working-Class 
Lives,‖ pp. 57–94).  
 33. In 2008, whites possessed on average more than nine times the household wealth of 
African Americans and Latinos according to Roediger, supra note 2, at B6–10. For a more 
elaborate treatment of the continuance of black/white economic inequality, see MELVIN L. 
OLIVER AND THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
RACIAL INEQUALITY (2d ed. 2006). 
 34. My sources here are my undergraduate students at Washington University in St. 
Louis. When I talk about sexuality and contemporary undergraduate norms with them, I 
frequently ask them whether, according to their perceptions, a double sexual standard between 
women and men continues to exist. Always, the response to this question is an unqualified and 
very strong ―yes.‖ I have no reason to believe that the undergraduate population at Washington 
University in St. Louis is markedly different from that of other undergraduate populations in 
regards to this issue.  
 35. An essay that powerfully describe the mechanisms, both social and psychological, 
which keep these norms in place is by Sandra Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, and the 
Modernization of Patriarchal Power, in FEMININITY AND DOMINATION, 63 (1990); see also 
NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN 
(1991).  
 36. According to the website of the National Eating Disorders Association, ninety to 
ninety-five percent of anorexics are female. National Eating Disorders Association, 
http://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org. This website cites this statistic from the American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994.  
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housework.
37
 Moreover, while women are a greater part of the paid 
labor force then they were forty years ago, women still earn 
disproportionately less than do men.
38
 
In short, race and gender still matter in many of the areas that 
Black Power and radical feminism had said that they mattered forty 
years ago: in terms of self and other identification and valuation, in 
terms of the continued operation of ―sex roles,‖ and in terms of the 
differential access of non-whites and women to economic resources. 
Consequently, any talk that we are all ―just individuals‖ and that race 
and gender are no longer relevant cannot be completely true. The 
qualification, however, is that in all of these areas, these categories 
matter less pervasively and less homogeneously than they did forty 
years ago. While African Americans remain disproportionally poor in 
relation to European Americans, there does exist a larger African 
American middle class than existed forty years ago.
39
 Similarly, 
studies that show that employed women continue to do an unequal 
share of housework and childcare also indicate that their share has 
decreased from what it was during the 1960s.
40
 Consequently, an 
emphasis upon human similarity and individuality does seem to 
underscore one of the central weaknesses in both Black Power and 
radical feminism‘s theoretical and political analyses: both groups 
tended to speak of the social categories of race and sex respectively 
in too stark and homogeneous ways. 
When anthropologists initially introduced the newer, more 
democratic concept of ―culture‖ into public discourse in the early part 
of the twentieth century, they tended to speak of a ―culture‖ as 
applicable to whole societies.
41
 This understanding of culture as 
 
 37. While men‘s housework contribution almost doubled during the period from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1990s, by the mid-1990s, men were still doing only about a third of the 
housework. Suzanne M. Bianci et al., Is Anyone Doing the Housework—Trends in the Gender 
Division of Household Labor, 79 SOCIAL FORCES 191 (2000). 
 38. Why is Her Paycheck Smaller?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/interactive/2009/03/01/business/20090301_WageGap.html. 
 39. An excellent discussion on the increase in the size of a black middle class from the 
1960s to today and on the causes of this increase and on the specific nature of this new black 
middle class can be found in BENJAMIN P. BOWSER, THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS: SOCIAL 
MOBILITY AND VULNERABILITY (2007) (see particularly chapter 6, ―From Affirmative Action 
to Diversity, pp. 101–26).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Clifford Geertz notes this way in which anthropology has understood ―culture‖ in 
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applicable to whole societies or to whole subgroups within a society 
became part also of the public understanding of ―culture.‖ 
Consequently, in the 1960s, when radical feminists and Black Power 
activists began talking about a black or a woman‘s ―culture,‖ they too 
understood this concept to refer to the distinctive perspectives and 
life practices of black people and women as a group. Moreover, this 
homogeneous understanding of culture fit in well with the political 
goals of both Black Power and radical feminism at this time. Since 
one of the important political goals of Black Power of the late 1960s 
was to unite African Americans across classes to form a unified 
political force, an emphasis upon what African Americans as a group 
shared became politically important. Moreover, in the positive 
reevaluation of African American practices and culture, activists also 
were drawn to an emphasis upon what African Americans shared. 
Radical feminists in the late 1960s and early 1970s also wanted to 
unite women as a political force and to positively reevaluate what 
was distinctive about women as a group. Thus, they too were drawn 
to encompassing understandings of the meanings of what it meant to 
be a woman and of women‘s ―culture.‖ 
However, these homogeneous understandings of race and gender 
soon began to generate political problems within black and feminist 
political movements and to inspire scholars sympathetic to these 
movements to question important aspects of these encompassing 
understandings. Black women soon began to claim that the 
homogeneous understandings of women‘s identity and women‘s 
culture that radical feminists were creating reflected white and 
heterosexual biases. They argued that radical feminists were not 
paying sufficient attention to differences among women.
42
 Similarly, 
 
Geertz, The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the Century, in AVAILABLE 
LIGHT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS 218 (2000). Susan 
Hegeman more extensively elaborates this point as she describes how the concept of culture 
assumed a ―spatial‖ aspect in early twentieth century anthropology. See Susan Hegeman, 
Terrains of Culture: Ruth Benedict, Waldo Frank, and the Spatialization of the Culture 
Concept, in PATTERNS FOR AMERICA: MODERNISM AND THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE 93 (1999).  
 42. Many of the important early writings by Black Feminists in the late 1970s and early 
1980s address the lack of attention among white feminists to issues specific to African 
American women. Some of these important writings include: ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, 
RACE AND CLASS (1981); The Combahee River Collective, supra note 27; THIS BRIDGE 
CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Identity after Identity Politics 67 
 
 
black women began to criticize many Black Power activists for their 
masculine and heterosexual biases, arguing that this movement 
needed to pay more attention to sexual differences within the black 
community.
43
 Activists and scholars sympathetic to the plight of the 
black poor began to raise questions about Black Power‘s erasure of 
class differences among African Americans.
44
 
These political and scholarly attacks on homogeneous 
understandings of gender and race soon became matched by 
intellectual challenges to homogeneous understandings of social 
identity in general. Scholars began to point out how social identity is 
complex in a variety of ways. For one, as is obvious, and as was 
somewhat recognized by early identity political activists, individuals 
occupy many social categories. However, secondly, and as was less 
recognized by such early activists, these categories do not operate 
independently of each other, but are interactive, each changing the 
meaning and significance of the operation of the others in the life 
stories of individuals.
45
 Black feminist scholars began to use the 
concept of ―intersectionality‖ to point out that black women do not 
experience race and sex as two independent organizing principles but 
as intersecting principles that cause the lives of black women to be 
different from both those of black men and white women.
46
  
 
Anzaldua eds., 1981); GLORIA T. HULL, PATRICIA BELL SCOTT, AND BARBARA SMITH, ALL 
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 43. An important early voice on the issue of Black Power‘s lack of attention to 
male/female issues was that of MICHELLE WALLACE, BLACK MACHO AND THE MYTH OF THE 
SUPERWOMAN (1979). A feminist who early spoke against the homophobia in Black Power and 
its inattention to issues of sexual orientation was Cheryl Clarke, The Failure to Transform: 
Homophobia in The Black Community, in Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology (Barbara 
Smith ed., 1983).  
 44. Adolf Reed has elaborated on this point. See Adolph L. Reed, Jr., Black Particularity 
Reconsidered, in IS IT NATION TIME?: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON BLACK POWER AND BLACK 
NATIONALISM 39 (Eddie S. Galude, Jr. ed., 2002). Cornell West makes a similar point in his 
essay The Paradox of the African American Rebellion, IS IT NATION TIME?: CONTEMPORARY 
ESSAYS ON BLACK POWER AND BLACK NATIONALISM 22 (Eddie S. Galude, Jr. ed., 2002) 
 45. Elizabeth Spelman elaborated on the ways in which feminists had tended to 
conceptualize these categories of identity as separable phenomena in ELIZABETH SPELMAN, 
INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988). 
 46. Deborah King, Multiple Jeopardy: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, in 
FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 220 (Alison Jaggar & Paula Rothenberg eds., 3d ed. 1993). Kimberle 
Crenshaw was also an important early theorist on the concept of ―intersectionality‖ drawing 
out, in particular, its implications for the law. A few of her early essays on this concept include: 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Intersectionality and Identity Politics: Learning from Violence against 
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Such political and scholarly understandings of the complex ways 
in which identity works cohere well with some of the complicated 
ways in which race and gender have themselves come to manifest 
themselves forty years after the emergence of identity politics. While 
race and sex also operated in complex ways in the 1960s, some of 
their operations—such as the application of Jim Crow laws in the 
South—were so pervasive that it was relatively easy for proponents 
of identity politics to think of their effects in the kinds of 
homogeneous ways that they did. But as the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
made that kind of broad-based discrimination illegal, and as the 
feminist and Black Power movements of the 1960s themselves 
opened up new life opportunities for some groups of women and 
African Americans, some of the complexities of the operations of 
race and sex have themselves become more explicit. For example, as 
noted, one effect of the changing laws and political efforts of the 
1960s has been the growth of a larger black middle class in the 
United States. But as a black middle class has grown, so has it 
become easier to see how racism manifests itself differently for 
members of different social classes. Similarly, as more African 
Americans are allowed into positions of economic and political 
leadership, it is easier to see how blackness operates differently for 
men and for women in public leadership roles. Thus, as the categories 
of race and gender manifest themselves in less homogeneous ways 
than they did forty years ago, so have many scholars and activists 
simultaneously come to understand the limitations of a politics that 
even forty years ago framed the operation of these categories too 
simplistically. 
But this recognition of the complex operation of these categories 
has been mostly confined to activists and scholars and even here the 
 
Women of Color, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 178 
(Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma Narayan eds., 1997); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the 
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conceptual advances have not, for the most part, gone far enough in 
addressing some of the complexities in the ways in which race and 
sex operate. One of the important, though still relatively overlooked, 
factors complicating the operation of race and sex that even the 
concept of intersectionality does not necessarily address is the factor 
of social context. Racism affects an individual differently not only 
because of the intersecting influence of other social categories that an 
individual inhabits, but also because of social situation. The same can 
be said about the operation of sexism. And because so many of the 
ways in which we have advanced or failed to advance in terms of 
racism and sexism over the last forty years have been related to 
context—with some contexts, such as public accommodations, 
remarkably different today than they were forty years ago, and others, 
such as neighborhood segregation, much less so—we need ways of 
thinking about the operation of these categories that take into account 
this crucial factor.
47
 
Such new ways of thinking about how race and gender operate 
must take us beyond twentieth century environmentalist accounts. 
Both those who used environmentalism to stress the superficiality of 
race and gender and those who used it to stress the depth of these 
categories, have tended to think of race and gender as social 
constants. Thus both those who accepted the idea that the traits 
associated with race and gender were individual and relatively 
superficial and those who accepted the idea that they could be found 
deeply among all members of a given social group, assumed that the 
traits associated with such categories, those of physiology as well as 
those of character, were given properties of human beings that had 
relatively given meaning and effects across social contexts, either 
minimal in the one case or maximal in the other. But a problem with 
 
 47. Focusing on the importance of context helps us better understand the contribution of 
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING 
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (1978). The publication of this book generated controversy with 
some claiming that Wilson was not sufficiently aware of the continuance of race in affecting the 
life possibilities of African Americans. But if we interpret the argument of this book as stating 
that many of the contexts in which African Americans operate have been increasingly affected 
by factors of class and less affected by factors of race since the middle of the twentieth century, 
then one need not interpret Wilson as denying the contexts where race still continues to matter. 
A focus on context enables us to get beyond an ―either/or‖ position on the relevance of race. 
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this way of thinking about race and gender is that it does not allow us 
to see how the ways in which individuals ―possess‖ race and gender, 
or are understood by others as ―possessing‖ racial and gender 
attributes, can be different in different situations. It does not allow us 
to see, for example, that the fact that an individual has a certain skin 
tone is more relevant to the possessor of that skin tone and to external 
observers in different contexts. But if race is understood primarily as 
that which links given traits to given bodies in constant ways, with 
effects that transcend contexts, how can race appear or disappear in 
this kind of way? 
One means of helping us move beyond the idea of race and gender 
as social constants is to focus more extensively on the categories of 
race and sex as social meanings, as ways in which we understand 
ourselves and others. As social meanings, they do identify and 
associate bodies and traits, but they do so only through interpretation 
and projection, processes that allow for degrees of variability within 
different contexts. 
One theorist whose work, particularly in relation to gender, has 
been useful in pushing us away from thinking of gender less as a 
constant and more in terms of interpretive projections that change 
across contexts is Judith Butler. Butler‘s idea of ―performance‖ helps 
us grasp the ―detachability‖ and ―variability‖ of the ways in which 
gender works, a variability associated with its symbolic nature. Her 
analyses of the deep psychological processes involved in such 
enactments—processes involving factors such as anxiety, fantasy, 
and projection—help us see how such enactments can be variable in 
different contexts, yet also rooted in deep psychic needs. And her 
discussions of the harsh consequences that can accompany socially 
unacceptable ―performances‖ of gender, for example, of those with 
masculine identified bodies who enact feminine associated behaviors, 
reminds us that the ―play‖ of gender is a socially interactive process 
whose stakes can be matters of life and death.
48
  
 
 48. These ideas are all explored in Butler‘s major works, including among others, JUDITH 
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); JUDITH 
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF ‗SEX‘ (1993); and JUDITH 
BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997). 
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I want to elaborate on Butler‘s ideas, not only by noting their 
applicability to the social category of race, but also by exploring 
more explicitly how an emphasis on the symbolic/linguistic aspect of 
these categories helps us see gender and race as possessing situational 
meaning. Because bodies, behaviors, clothing, etc. and their 
relationships gain their import only through social interpretation, that 
import is capable of ―slide‖ when these interact with other variables, 
such as those presented by differing contexts. ―Masculinity,‖ for 
example, does not represent a fixed set of attributes. Rather it 
represents a description of certain behaviors, styles of dress, etc. 
within particular contexts. A tuxedo may signify ―masculinity‖ at a 
society ball while signifying an effeminate form of maleness at a 
working class bar. Similarly, a particular skin tone can change its 
meaning as it moves among different contexts—such as through 
association with different types of speech in different parts of the 
world.  
Focusing on the symbolic/linguistic aspect of these categories as 
making possible their situational meanings should not, however, 
detract us from the important social facticity of these categories. 
Language, as we know, while capable of much variability, both in 
relation to context and time, is a deeply social phenomenon. 
Individuals can play with language, but if they wish to communicate 
and be understood, they must also constrain that play within socially 
given limits. Similarly, while race and gender interpret bodies, 
behaviors, and specific situations, they do so, not privately, but 
within the constraints of socially given understandings. While a dark 
skinned individual in the contemporary United States may affect 
some of the ways in which his or her racial identity is interpreted, 
through adaptations of dress, speech patterns, and bodily 
mannerisms, there are limits to that individual‘s power to affect how 
his or her skin tone is read, again varying within different contexts. 
As language is not a private affair, so also are the interpretations for 
bodily characteristics not up to any individual alone. 
Moreover, to emphasize the symbolic/linguistic aspects of race 
and gender is not to suggest that symbolism and language encompass 
all we need to know about race and gender. Social meanings of any 
importance rarely exist ―in the head only‖ but become embedded in 
laws and institutions that generate effects of their own, material as 
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well as symbolic, and these effects may be more or less variable 
across contexts. For example, while gays and lesbians today wish to 
extend the meaning of ―family‖ to include their intimate 
commitments, and may, at this moment in time, have achieved that 
meaning within a certain sector of the U.S. population, until that 
extended meaning is embodied in the laws and institutions that 
govern family life in the U.S., those changes in accepted meanings 
will have relatively little effect on many aspects of gay and lesbian 
life. When we recognize that the laws and institutions governing race 
and gender extend back within the United States to the very days of 
its founding, have had major social effects on the distribution of 
economic resources, as well as on many other aspects of social life, 
and that much of the legacy of those effects are still with us, then we 
must think of gender and race in social structural as well as in 
symbolic/linguistic terms and assess the specificity/pervasiveness of 
such structures as well as the specificity/pervasiveness of our 
understandings of race and gender. 
Consequently, to emphasize the symbolic/linguistic aspects of 
race and gender is not to challenge the social facticity and structural 
importance of either nor to deny that social meanings and social 
structures interact with each other in complex ways. But this 
emphasis does also allow us to open up spaces for understanding 
some of the complexities and unevenness in the ways in which both 
categories operate today, in particular to understand better the 
situational meanings associated with both. To think about race and 
gender in terms of social meanings allows us to more fully 
comprehend the potential variability of the meanings of race and 
gender across contexts. For example, it allows us to see how the 
meanings of both might have stretched and changed within certain 
contexts over the past forty years while retaining their past meanings 
within others. For example, today, after the election of Barack 
Obama to the presidency of the United States, it is now more readily 
possible to associate ―African American‖ with ―President of the 
United States,‖ providing for a new stretch in one aspect of the 
meaning of ―African American.‖ But this new association does not in 
and of itself negate the continued reality of other associations, such 
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as, for example, in the minds of many, a continued association of 
poor, black, young, and male with danger.
49
 
This way of thinking gives us a lot more flexibility in formulating 
certain aspects of public policy than did the older frameworks, 
frameworks that forced us to choose between claims that race and 
gender continue to matter, or alternatively, no longer matter, in global 
ways. It allows us to focus in on specific contexts where the bodily 
features historically associated with race or gender continue to have 
social import, to ask what that import is, and then to ask whether this 
import is one we wish to minimize or not. It allows us to address such 
questions as local questions, with local answers rather than as global 
questions, with global answers. Consequently, this kind of approach 
helps us approach policy issues more in empirical rather than 
philosophical ways, to treat, for example, as an empirical question 
whether a specific high school program that talks about race and 
educational accomplishment does more to eradicate associations 
made between these phenomena by a specific high school population 
than do programs that prohibit race talk altogether. And if the answer 
to this question is found to be yes, that answer need not entail the 
desirability of implementing such programs among other populations. 
In sum, it is time we move beyond the last premise of nineteenth 
century understandings of race and gender—that these categories 
describe collections of attributes that attach to human beings and 
generate fixed reactions across social situations—and instead come to 
see these categories more in terms of social meanings that vary across 
social contexts. To the extent that we can understand these categories 
more in such terms, to that extent can we deal with the operation of 
such categories in some of the complex ways that social reality today 
demands. Today, against the claim that we are all ―just individuals‖ is 
 
 49. This focus on race and gender as social meanings ties in with new ways some 
philosophers are thinking about meaning. Some are moving away from thinking about meaning 
in terms of lists of phenomena associated with words and more in terms of mental processes 
that bring together or blend phenomena. Blending is seen as a process where a great deal—
though not unlimited—flexibility can occur. This idea of blending as a process capable of some, 
though not unlimited, variability seems a very useful way of capturing what we mean by such 
social categories of race and gender. As I am arguing, these are categories whose meanings are 
not captured by any list of traits, but are ways of interpreting bodies, traits, and their 
associations in a variety of ways. For a useful discussion of meaning in terms of blending see 
MARK TURNER, THE LITERARY MIND: THE ORIGINS OF THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1996).  
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the reality that race and gender still matter in terms of self and other 
perception, community identification, and in terms of access to 
economic and cultural resources. On the other hand, these social 
categories also do not matter for all in the same kinds of ways that 
they mattered forty years ago. Our present discourse, composed of 
overly general claims either that race and gender no longer matter or 
that they matter in encompassing, homogeneous ways, commits us to 
needless contradiction and bad policy. A twenty-first century 
discourse on race and gender demands better than that.  
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